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Disclaimer
Working papers are intended to report exploratory results of research and analysis undertaken by the 
Division of Science Resources Statistics. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations 
expressed in this working paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
This working paper has been released to inform interested parties of ongoing research or activities and to 
encourage further discussion of the topic.
Abstract
 
This paper provides an overview of research issues related to the effects of the 
growing migration of highly skilled workers on the world economy and economic 
policy, with special reference to the international mobility of scientists and engineers.
It points out U.S. data sets (collected by the National Science Foundation's Division 
of Science Resources Statistics, other Government agencies, and private 
organizations) that, along with databases from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the European Union, may be used to provide at 
least partial answers to questions prompted by these issues. The paper lays out a 
theoretically informed road map for the better understanding of these dynamic and 
far-reaching developments.
Introduction
Cross-border migration of highly skilled persons has expanded markedly, making it a 
focus of intense policy interest in many countries. In both the developed and 
less-developed world, keeping or attracting highly skilled workers is a key part of 
national economic policy and is a consideration not just for immigration policies but 
also plans for higher education, research funding, international investment, and even 
tax policies. This paper seeks to clarify the dimensions of some of the major 
outstanding research issues about the effects of this growing migration, particularly 
the migration of scientists and engineers.
Migration across national borders provokes many spirited political and policy 
debates. Although these debates are often most contentious when they deal with 
migrants with lower skills, highly skilled migrants are usually employed in the types 
of jobs that some would prefer go to natives or citizens. At the same time, 
governments in both less-developed and many developed countries worry about 
losing their more highly educated workers. As high-skill migration appears to 
become more important to the world economy, understanding its likely effects 
becomes all the more significant. Unfortunately, these effects have not been well 
studied or measured.
As the world's largest economy, as the largest educator of foreign students, and as a 
traditional nation of immigration, the United States is an important nexus for the 
international movement of highly skilled workers. The 2000 Decennial Census 
showed that a large proportion of highly skilled U.S. workers are foreign born. This 
includes 25.7% of all employed doctorate holders and 37.6% of doctorate holders in 
science and engineering (S&E) occupations. Although U.S. data on high-skill 
migration constitute only one piece of a much larger and complex picture, they are 
comparatively rich data that provide some general insights into the magnitude and 
direction of some of the possible effects of high-skill migration throughout the world.
This paper raises as research issues possible negative and positive effects from the 
perspectives of both receiving and sending countries, and possible global 
consequences of high-skilled migration. Many of these issues are in turn related to 
unanswered questions in labor market theory and economic growth theory, for 
example: How interchangeable are skills among those with specialized knowledge? 
Does the presence of highly skilled workers in an economy affect firms' decisions 
about investment and research and development (R&D) (e.g., increasing demand over
time for highly skilled workers)? Do more scientists lead to more knowledge? This 
paper does not provide answers to these types of questions. Instead, it examines how 
these and other questions, along with the paucity of good data, affect the 
understanding of high-skill migration.
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National and Global Consequences of High-Skill Migration
Table 1 outlines likely or possible economic effects of international high-skill 
migration. The possible positive and negative economic effects for both the sending 
and receiving countries must be considered. In addition to country-level effects, there
are also global effects on the growth of technology and knowledge that cannot easily 
be assigned to individual polities.
The categories "receiving" and "sending" are not synonymous with "developed" and 
"less developed." Many developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, have 
expressed concerns about retaining their researchers, and many less-developed 
countries attract foreign talent in subject areas in which they are able to offer 
opportunities to study or to use unique geological and biological natural resources. 
Indeed, many countries are both net receivers and net senders in different skill areas.
TABLE 1.  Possible global and national effects of international high-skill migration 
Sending countries 
Possible positives 
• Increased incentive for natives to seek higher skills. 
• Possibility of exporting skills, which reduces risk and raises 
expected return of personal education investments. 
• Increase in domestic economic return to skills. 
• Knowledge flows and collaboration.  
• Increased ties to foreign research institutions. 
• Export opportunities for technology and other products and 
services. 
• Return of natives with foreign education and human capital. 
• Remittances and other support from diaspora networks. 
Possible negatives 
• “Brain drain”: Lost productive capacity due to at least temporary 
absence of workers and students with higher skills. 
• Less support for public funding of higher education.  
• Training and research areas may not reflect local priorities (e.g., 
cancer, not malaria.) 
Receiving countries 
Possible positives 
• Increased research and development and economic activity due 
to availability of additional highly skilled workers. 
• Knowledge flows and collaboration.  
• Increased ties to foreign research institutions. 
• Export opportunities for technology. 
• Increased enrollment in graduate programs, with the possible 
result of keeping smaller programs alive and maintaining quality 
in larger programs. 
Possible negatives 
• Decreased incentive of natives to seek higher skills. 
• Possibility of displacement of native students from best schools. 
• Language and cultural barriers between native and immigrant 
highly skilled workers. 
• Technology transfers to competitors and to possibly hostile 
countries. 
Possible global effects 
• Better international flow of knowledge for both commerce and research. 
• Better job matches through global job search. 
• Greater employment options for workers and researchers. 
• Greater ability of employers to find rare or unique skill sets. 
• Formation of international research or technology clusters (e.g., Silicon Valley, CERN). 
• Net positive effect on incentives for individual human capital investments as a result of international competition for scarce human 
capital. 
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Few of the possible effects discussed in this paper are well established empirically, 
although some "indicator" data do exist. Thus, this report primarily represents an 
agenda for research.
Negative Effects for Sending Countries
A loss of productive capacity because of the loss (at least temporarily) of highly 
skilled workers and students is the most discussed negative effect of high-skill 
migration on sending countries. This brain drain has been an issue not just for 
countries but for any area whose educated natives migrate. In the United States, for 
example, rural states often worry about graduates of their state universities moving to
other parts of the country, where their skills are in greater demand. Although 
movement to a country willing to pay a higher wage for a given skill is, by one 
definition, a movement to a place with a higher demand for that skill, some have 
argued that this should not be the only measure. For example, the addition of a single 
medical doctor may have a greater effect on the health of individuals in a 
less-developed country than it would in a developed country.
In addition to the direct effect on the availability of highly skilled labor, reduced 
political support for funding for higher education may be a possible consequence of 
highly educated workers leaving a country. Publicly funded education is a service 
provided to a country's citizens, but it is also considered to be a tool for economic 
development, even in highly developed countries like the United States. Migration of 
graduates is often viewed, whether correctly or not, as a loss of an investment.[1]
College-educated foreign-born individuals in the United States receive significant 
portions of their formal education outside the United States. As shown by the 
National Survey of College Graduates, about 55% of college-educated foreign-born 
individuals in 2003 had at least one postsecondary degree from an institution outside 
the United States, and 41% had their highest degree (or most recent degree, if at the 
same degree level) from a foreign institution (see Table 2). Even at the highest 
education level, more than one-third of foreign-born doctorate holders who were 
residents in the United States received their doctorates from foreign institutions. 
Although many immigrants to the United States arrive as children, 69% of the 
college-educated foreign born graduated from a foreign secondary school, their 
preuniversity education having occurred outside the United States.
Many countries are concerned about the return rates of their nationals who go to other
countries for graduate training. Finn (2005) shows that more than half (61%) of 1998 
temporary-visa recipients of S&E doctorates from U.S. schools were working in the 
United States in 2003.
TABLE 2.  Share of college-educated foreign-born individuals in United States holding foreign degrees: 2003
(Percent)
Foreign university
Degree level Highest degree Any degree Foreign secondary school
All degree levels 41.4 54.8 69.2
Bachelor’s 47.9 49.7 65.8
Master’s 26.8 58.6 74.2
Doctorate 36.3 78.6 93.0
Professional 49.5 58.5 63.3
SOURCES: National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data 
System (SESTAT) (2003), http://sestat.nsf.gov; and National Survey of College Graduates (2003).
4
Positive Effects for Sending Countries
Less often discussed are the positive effects that may exist for countries whose highly
skilled natives and citizens move across borders. In part, this is because of 
measurement difficulties. Although data on international migration are often poor, 
counts of initial migrations of people are easier to obtain than data on return 
migration or return knowledge flows.[2] Nevertheless, several indicators show that
such benefits might exist. Although there is talk of brain drain, others have talked of 
brain gain or brain circulation to describe some of these complex effects.
Incentives for Human Capital Investment
The effect most difficult to measure—but theoretically most likely to benefit
countries sending highly skilled workers—may be an increase in the incentive for
natives to invest in their own human capital. In theory, this can occur through four
mechanisms: (1) an increase in the domestic return to skills because of the relative
scarcity created by the brain drain; (2) the incentive effect of an increase in the
expected value of an individual's human capital investment if that individual has
migration as an option; (3) a reduction in the risk associated with the return on
individual human capital investment if migration serves as a labor market stabilizer;
and (4) an increase in the domestic demand for skilled labor because of increased ties
to foreign business and R&D activities.
The first mechanism is the improvement of labor market conditions for highly skilled 
workers when emigration to other national labor markets reduces the domestic supply
of these workers. Wages and unemployment for highly skilled workers in 
less-developed countries (with less-developed financial markets and entrepreneurial 
infrastructure) may be particularly sensitive to oversupply. Other channels through 
which migration leads to increased supply may, of course, offset this.
The second mechanism results from uncertainties that individuals might have about 
their likely migration behavior.[3] When the expected foreign value of human capital
is much greater than the domestic value, even a small nonzero expectation of 
migration may have an important effect on the expected value of a human capital 
investment decision. Thus, the existence of a foreign demand for their skill may 
influence even those with strong preferences against migration.
The third mechanism depends on whether the amount of emigration of highly skilled 
labor from a country is related to current labor market conditions. A downturn in a 
country's demand for highly skilled labor that causes more highly skilled workers to 
leave might tend to reduce fluctuations in employment and salaries, thereby reducing 
the risk associated with the human capital investment. The considerable investments 
required for an individual to acquire higher skills might seem less worthwhile if the 
labor market demand for those skills is volatile.[4] To some extent, this effect of
immigration as a labor market stabilizer may be offset by any instability caused by 
return migration driven by changes in conditions in the receiving countries.[5]
The fourth mechanism, increasing domestic returns to human capital investment, is 
simply the secondary effect on the demand for skills of the positive economic effects 
discussed below. Indeed, a 1% increase in gross domestic product (GDP) due to 
increased access to technology and foreign collaboration may increase demands for 
skills more than a 1% increase in GDP due to factors like increased export 
commodity prices. Exploiting knowledge usually implies an increasing demand for 
higher skills. 
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International migrants (other than refugees) seldom break all ties with their country 
of origin. There is reason to believe that highly skilled migrants who have extensive 
education and, often, work experience in their country of origin maintain contacts 
with former colleagues and education institutions. These contacts may provide a 
benefit for sending nations by facilitating the formation of international networks of 
contacts and knowledge exchange, both with expatriate natives and with contacts that
returning expatriates nurtured while abroad. Some evidence for this is seen in figure
1, which shows a positive 0.66 correlation between the log of the number of U.S. 
doctorates received by those born in a foreign country and the percentage of that 
country's internationally coauthored articles with the United States.[6]
That contacts in graduate school may lead to research collaboration across borders is
not unexpected. The same effect is likely to be created by the international
movements of people employed by industries. Movement of workers between firms
has long been recognized as a powerful source of knowledge transfer—both of
technology and of more subtle forms of knowledge such as business practices and
networks of contacts—and the knowledge transfer is likely to be even more
significant when the firms are across national borders.
Knowledge Flow and Collaboration
FIGURE 1.  Relationship of foreign-born U.S. S&E doctorate recipients to their country's scientific collaboration with United
States: 1994–98 graduates and 1999–2003 articles
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SOURCES:  Thomson ISI, Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index, http://www.isinet.com/products/citation/; ipIQ, Inc.;  National Science 
Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Earned Doctorates (1994–98), special tabulations; and National Science Board, Science and 
Engineering Indicators, 2006.
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An important (although not necessary) way for a sending country to benefit from the 
flow of knowledge is for its natives to return after they have spent a period of time 
outside the country either in school or working. Despite wage differentials and other 
differences in opportunities, return migrations are common, even between developed 
and less-developed countries.[7] To a great extent, this is unsurprising and reflects
the importance of cultural and family ties to migrants. Another factor that encourages 
return migration is the temporary nature of the work permits that many countries use 
as their primary method for allowing employers to recruit noncitizens. For example, 
the most common visa the United States issues to highly skilled workers, the H-1B 
visa, has a duration of 3 years, allows a single 3-year renewal period, and is not 
formally part of any path to a permanent visa.[8]
Finn (2005) showed that slightly more than three-fifths of foreign students with 
temporary visas who received U.S. S&E doctorates in 1998 were still working in the 
United States 5 years later.[9] This implies that the other two-fifths left the United 
States[10] with training received at a U.S. university and perhaps a postdoc position 
or other postgraduate work experience. As shown in table 3, Finn (2005) found that 
5-year-stay rates varied by field of degree, ranging in 2003 from 36% in economics to
70% in computer science and computer and electronic engineering.
Also noteworthy is that for a given Ph.D. cohort, the stay rates shown in table 3 hold 
reasonably steady for time since degree. However, data from another source, the 
National Science Foundation's (NSF's) 1995 Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR), 
suggest that even among those who do stay in the United States immediately after 
graduation, many leave after a period of time. But others return after initially leaving,
thus producing the relatively steady estimates of the proportion in the United States 
over the five-year period. A complex pattern of migration of this form would enhance
the role of foreign students in the knowledge networks between countries.[11]
Some of this migration pattern among Ph.D. holders is suggested by data from the 
1995 SDR. In that year, a special effort was made in collecting data for the SDR to 
discover whether survey nonrespondents resided outside the United States. Table 4
presents estimates of foreign-born recipients of U.S. S&E doctorates working outside 
the United States derived from the 1995 SDR. Because it is quite possible that other 
nonrespondents whose locations were never discovered also resided outside the 
United States, these should be considered lower bound estimates. 
TABLE 3.  Temporary visa holders who recieved a U.S. doctorate and work in the United States: 1999–2003
(Percent)
Degree field 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
All fields 66 64 63 62 61
Agricultural sciences 48 47 47 47 46
Computer sciences 71 71 72 72 70
Economics 40 39 37 37 36
Life sciences 72 68 67 68 67
Mathematics 67 63 62 60 59
Physical sciences 75 74 72 71 69
Other social sciences 39 38 37 37 37
Computer/electrical engineering 78 76 75 74 70
Other engineering 69 67 67 65 64
SOURCE: Michael Finn, Stay Rates of Foreign Doctorate Recipients From U.S. Universities, 2003, Oak Ridge Insitute for Science and 
Education (2005).
Return of Natives with Foreign Education and Human Capital
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The SDR covers all those with S&E doctorates from U.S. schools who had plans to 
stay in the United States immediately after receiving their degree.[12] Thus, the only 
foreign-born doctorate recipients represented in the SDR are those with plans to stay 
at the time of degree conferral. Among this group, about one-fifth of those who 
graduated in the last three decades were identified as residing abroad; in the case of 
graduates from the last 10 years, more than 4% had left the United States in the 
previous 2 years.
In addition to knowledge transfers, the return of natives to a sending country also 
brings a gain of human capital that may not have been developed had the migrants 
stayed in their home countries. There are several reasons for this. Differences in the 
availability or quality of particular areas of university instruction may have been a 
reason for the original cross-border movement. Knowledge of unique technologies 
may also be gained in formal employment. In addition, foreign employers and 
educational institutions often finance both formal education and job-related training 
to a considerable extent.
Support from Diaspora Networks
In the general immigration literature, many studies have analyzed the effects of 
having large populations of natives outside a country's border.[13] These include the 
creation of new export opportunities for their home countries, the creation of 
transnational social networks to facilitate business contacts and knowledge transfer, 
and the value of remittances to relatives and institutions in their home countries. It 
seems plausible that highly skilled migrants create the same type of opportunities, 
albeit sometimes in different ways. 
Lower skilled migrants often form part of the retail and wholesale infrastructure in 
their new countries. Highly skilled migrants may be less likely to become retail or 
wholesale managers but more likely to be involved in the purchase or selection of 
technology products and services. For example, significant anecdotal evidence shows
that Indian migrants have played a key role in business partnerships and relationships 
between U.S. and Indian technology firms.[14]
Remittances from highly skilled migrants may also be only a variation of the 
phenomenon discussed in the general immigration literature.[15] Highly skilled 
migrants are fewer in number than other migrants but often earn higher incomes. In 
addition to giving gifts to relatives, highly skilled migrants may serve significant 
financial or other roles as alumni of educational institutions in their home countries.
TABLE 4.  Estimates of foreign-born U.S. S&E doctorate recipients with initial U.S. employment 
working outside United States: 1995
(Percent)
Decade of doctorate  Residing outside U.S. in 1995 Left U.S. 1993 or later
1945–54 6.1 0.6
1955–64 13.7 0.8
1965–74 22.7 1.3
1975–84 22.2 2.3
1985–94 19.4 4.1
NOTE:  Data include foreign-born U.S. citizens and permanent residents, as well as temporary visa holders 
who expressed definite plans to stay in United States at time of receipt of doctoral degree. Since the location 
of many individuals could not be determined, these should be considered lower bound estimates of those 
working outside the United States.
SOURCE:  National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Doctorate 
Recipients (1993 and 1995).
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Many participants in discussions of immigration policy have been surprised in recent 
years to find that international high-skill migration is no less controversial within 
receiving countries than immigration in general. A large amount of the immigration 
literature seeks to find the effect of lower skilled immigrants on opportunities for 
lower skilled natives.[16] However, little research has been conducted on the effects 
of the migration of more highly skilled workers. Nevertheless, several effects can be 
hypothesized.
Decreased Incentive for Natives to Seek Higher Skills
If highly skilled migrants are substitutes for natives in the domestic labor market, 
then a normal type of static supply and demand analysis would suggest a reduction in 
the wages associated with higher skilled occupations.[17] This in turn would lead to a
decreased incentive for natives to make human capital investments.
Several theoretical factors may moderate any such effect on native human capital 
investment patterns. First, the same analyses that assume lower skilled migrants to be 
substitutes for both lower skilled natives and for capital also assume that highly 
skilled migrants are complements to both lower skilled workers and to capital. Thus, 
highly skilled migrants might do more to create new capital investment and 
utilization of a perhaps underused segment of the labor force. To some extent, higher 
skilled workers may produce economic changes that increase the demand for their 
services and thereby mitigate the effect of increased supply on compensation.
In addition, some types of high-skilled migration may complement, not substitute, for
some types of native high-skilled workers. Even when a migrant has exactly the same
degree level and field of study as a native (i.e., master's degree in chemical
engineering, or a doctorate in biology), the knowledge of particular processes and
technologies can be very different—adding value as a collaborator rather than as a
competitor.
Although no detailed econometric studies have been done, the most basic statistics 
suggest that high-skill migration is most prevalent in fields that present relatively 
good employment opportunities. Possible reasons for this include the following: 
Workers may be less willing to undertake the costs of migration unless the 
opportunities are great, employers may not want to pay the often considerable legal 
costs associated with obtaining work visas unless they face a tight domestic labor 
market, and the influx of diverse human capital brought by migrants may contribute 
to creating opportunities in a field.
Figures 2 and 3 show the percentage of foreign-born holders of U.S. doctorates in
major S&E fields relative to measures of labor market conditions for recent (1–5
years after degree) doctorate recipients in those fields.
Negative Effects for Receiving Countries
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FIGURE 3.  Relationship of share of foreign-born U.S. S&E doctorate recipients to proportion of all S&E doctorate recipients
working involuntarily out-of-field: 1988-2002 graduates in 2003
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SOURCE:  National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data system (SESTAT) 
(2003), http://sestat.nsf.gov.
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FIGURE 2.  Relationship of share of foreign-born U.S. S&E doctorate recipients  to median salary for all S&E doctorate recipients
in same S&E field: 1998–2002 graduates in 2003
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salary. This is not driven just by the high percentage of foreign-born individuals 
among U.S. doctorate holders in engineering; higher foreign-born representation is 
associated with higher salaries in many broad fields. In the social sciences, 
economists are paid more than sociologists. In the life sciences, biological scientists 
are paid more than agricultural scientists. In the physical sciences, physicists are paid 
more than geologists. In each case, the lower paid field had relatively fewer 
foreign-born doctorate holders. Figure 2 shows a strong positive correlation (0.67) 
between median salary and the percentage of foreign-born individuals among those 
who received a U.S. S&E doctorate within the previous 5 years.
The same pattern holds when comparing the percentage of foreign-born doctorate 
holders among those in a particular field receiving their degree in the previous five 
years with a measure of labor market distress. For highly skilled workers, the 
unemployment rate can be a poor measure of labor market conditions in a field 
because highly skilled workers are usually highly employable in some capacity. The 
percentage of highly skilled workers involuntarily working outside their field of 
degree, a statistic that can be generated from the SDR or other components of NSF's 
Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT), often provides a more 
sensitive indicator of labor market conditions. Figure 3 shows the percentage of 
recent recipients of U.S. S&E doctorates working involuntarily outside their field to 
be inversely correlated (-0.32) with the percentage of foreign-born recipients among 
U.S. S&E doctorates.
Crowding Out of Natives in Advanced Education
Another often-discussed but little-studied possible effect of high-skill migration on 
receiving countries is a crowding out of natives in graduate programs and other 
sources of advanced training. To some extent, this argument is simple to understand: 
If a given university has a limited number of openings for graduate students, then a 
migrant student would prevent a native from taking that slot.
The number of graduate departments with some flexibility in the number of students 
they admit may offset this argument, at least in terms of aggregate positions in 
graduate programs. Beyond the top tier of institutions, some graduate programs might
prefer to admit more high-quality graduate students to help faculty with both teaching
and research. This may be particularly true for graduate programs that have trouble 
justifying their existence in terms of total graduate enrollment.
NSF's Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering
(GSS), an annual survey that tabulates the enrollment of graduate S&E departments,
can be used to examine the issue of displacement. Using GSS records for 1982–95, a
pooled longitudinal file can be created with academic departments as the unit of
observation.[18] This file can be used to make empirical estimates of the observed 
effect of a change in the foreign student enrollment on the enrollment of various 
ethnic categories of U.S. citizens and permanent residents. As table 5 shows, an 
increase in enrollment of 1.0 foreign students is associated with an enrollment 
increase of 0.33 for white U.S. students, an increase of 0.02 for U.S. underrepresented
minority students, and a decrease of 0.07 for U.S. Asian students. With the exception 
of the odd, if small, decrease for U.S. Asians,[19] an increase in enrollment for one
group is associated with increases in enrollment for all groups—a result inconsistent
with displacement.
In general, the higher the percentage of foreign-born doctorate holders, the higher the 
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[20] Although this criticism is 
Other Negative Effects
Cultural differences between natives and migrants and the possibility of technology 
transfer to potentially hostile countries or terrorist organizations are two other 
possible negative effects of high-skill migration for receiving nations. These effects 
are included here for the sake of thoroughness, although these topics have received 
even less analysis than other areas.
Some critics of high-skill migration have raised concerns that cultural differences 
between natives and migrants can be a barrier to native participation in technology. 
This criticism includes concerns about the ability of native students to understand the 
accents of foreign-born teachers and workplace discrimination against natives who 
are not part of the same ethnic group as their boss.
difficult to evaluate, to assume that this issue is not an important part of the political 
response to high-skill migration in many countries would be a mistake.
Technology transfer to potentially hostile countries or terrorist organizations is 
another issue that is difficult to analyze. In terms of a general transfer of knowledge 
that is useful to both civilian and defense industries, this almost certainly occurs. In 
the more specific sense of espionage to obtain classified information on sensitive 
technologies, the picture may be murkier. In the United States, some major public 
espionage cases have involved ethnic affinity (albeit by both naturalized and 
native-born citizens), but other cases have involved natives who were apparently 
motivated by money, power, or ideology.
Positive Effects for Receiving Countries
Many of the positive effects of high-skill migration for receiving countries are the 
same as those experienced by sending countries: gains related to increases in 
international collaboration and technology transfer, with the same implications for 
increasing domestic productivity and developing global markets. In the case of the 
United States, where relatively few native-born individuals migrate abroad for 
employment, many of its global connections come from foreign scientists and 
engineers. Both those who come to the United States to stay, and those who leave 
after a period of school or employment, form part of a network between U.S. research
institutions and business and foreign institutions.
Increased Economic Activity and R&D
Even in a model of high-skill migration that does not include brain circulation, 
receiving nations benefit from a brain gain. They experience an exogenous increase 
in their stock of human capital, often including scarce or unique sets of skills that are 
needed to overcome bottlenecks in production or research.
In the United States, highly skilled foreign-born workers make up a large part of the 
total S&E-educated labor force (see table 6). In 2003, more than one-third of S&E 
TABLE 5.  Comparison of change in foreign student enrollment with other enrollment changes at the departmental level: 1982–1995
Racial/ethnic group (U.S. citizen or permanent resident only)
Asian Non-Hispanic white Underrepresented minority
Estimated change in individuals enrolled in graduate department 
associated with increase of one foreign (temporary visa) student -0.07 0.33 0.02
Standard error 0.0019 0.0087 0.0021
NOTE:  Fixed effects (department-level) regression estimates of changes in enrollment of underrepresented minorities (black, Hispanic, American 
Indian/Alaska Native, Pacific Islander, and other race), controlling for department size in previous period, dummy variables for academic year, and 
change in departmental enrollment of other U.S. citizen/permanent resident groups.
SOURCE:  National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and 
Engineering (1982–1995), special tabluations.
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doctorate holders are foreign born, ranging from about 10% of psychology doctorate 
holders to 51% of doctorate holders in engineering and 57% in computer science. At 
the bachelor's degree level, 15% of S&E degree holders are foreign born, ranging 
from 7% of sociology/anthropology bachelor's degree holders to more than 
one-quarter in physics/astronomy and electrical engineering. 
These estimates, and others shown in table 6 from the NSF SESTAT data file, are 
underestimates of the total proportion of foreign-born scientists in the United States. 
Because of the practical difficulties involved in tracking highly skilled migrants, 
SESTAT data on the U.S. S&E labor force exclude individuals whose S&E degrees 
were obtained from foreign educational institutions unless they were in the United 
States as of the decennial census of 2000. This would exclude, for example, the 
majority of individuals who entered the United States with an H-1B temporary visa in
the 3 years between 2000 and 2003. Based on a sample of H-1B workers, the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service reported that 60% of H-1B visa recipients are
recruited outside of the United States and thus are more likely to hold foreign 
degrees.[21]
Comparing 2003 SESTAT estimates of the percentage of foreign-born individuals in 
S&E occupations with estimates from the 2000 census and the 2003 American 
Community Survey (ACS) gives one indicator of the possible undercount (see table
7). The 2003 SESTAT and 2000 Census estimates are similar, while the 2003 ACS 
shows a higher proportion.[22] The ACS proportion of foreign-born doctorate holders
in S&E occupations was 3.9 percentage points greater than that reported in NSF's 
2003 SESTAT database. Because SESTAT microrecords include a representative 
sample of individuals with new U.S. S&E degrees (both foreign born and native), the 
most likely explanation for these differences is the continuing entry in the early 2000s
of large numbers of scientists and engineers with foreign degrees.[23]
TABLE 6.  Foreign-born individuals with S&E degrees, by selected field and level of highest degree: 2003
(Percent)
Highest degree
Field All degree levels Bachelor’s Master’s Doctorate
All fields 18.9 15.2 27.2 34.6
Life sciences 16.7 12.6 21.2 36.2
Agricultural sciences 11.7 8.8 15.6 32.7
Biological sciences 19.1 14.7 23.9 37.4
Mathematics/computer sciences 25.8 19.3 40.4 47.5
Computer sciences 29.9 22.3 46.5 57.4
Mathematics 18.5 14.4 25.2 43.1
Physical sciences 23.0 16.9 28.9 36.9
Chemistry 25.5 18.2 42.0 37.0
Earth, atmospheric, and ocean sciences 11.4 8.3 13.0 26.2
Physics/astronomy 32.2 26.6 34.4 40.1
Social sciences 11.5 10.8 13.3 16.9
Economics 21.6 19.7 30.5 31.5
Political sciences 11.0 9.5 17.1 24.2
Psychology 9.7 10.1 8.5 9.8
Sociology/anthropology 7.2 6.7 10.2 13.6
Engineering 26.7 21.5 38.3 50.6
Chemical engineering 25.7 17.5 49.2 47.0
Civil engineering 24.9 19.7 39.5 54.2
Electrical engineering 34.0 28.1 45.9 57.0
Mechanical engineering 22.9 19.5 34.2 52.2
NOTE:  Data for omitted fields included in estimates for broader field groupings. 
SOURCE:  National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data 
System (SESTAT) (2003), http://sestat.nsf.gov.
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Knowledge Flow and Collaboration
As shown in figure 1 and discussed earlier, there are strong reasons to believe that 
international migration leads to increased international collaboration and transmission
of knowledge. For the United States, an increased connection to the rest of the world 
has always been a benefit of having large numbers of foreign students and large 
numbers of highly skilled immigrants.
This factor may become even more important as the rest of the world continues to 
expand its R&D capacity. U.S. R&D spending as a share of the global total declined 
during the 1990's and reached 36% in 1993, down from about 40% early in the 
decade (NSB 2006).
Increased Enrollment in Graduate Programs
Increased enrollment is the other side of concern about displacement of natives in 
graduate programs. In the United States, the availability of foreign students may 
allow many graduate departments to expand or maintain graduate programs. In other 
cases, foreign students may enable elite programs to maintain very high standards by 
allowing the programs to choose among the best of both foreign and native 
applicants.
Graduate programs are important sources of new research and knowledge in their 
own right, with students providing labor for research and teaching both informally 
and through relatively low-paid research and teaching assistantships. This graduate 
student labor may provide a benefit to receiving countries, even if foreign students 
leave immediately after graduation and play no part in later knowledge networks. 
In addition, colleges and universities receive some direct financial benefits from
foreign students in the form of tuition and fees. Data from the Institute for
International Education (IIE) show 81.8% of undergraduate international students in
the United States had personal and family funds as their primary source of support in
the 2003–04 academic year. At the graduate level, IIE shows 51.6% with personal
and family funds as their primary source of support.[24]
TABLE 7.  NSF versus census estimates of foreign-born individuals in S&E 
occupations, by education level: 2000 and 2003
(Percent)
2003 U.S. Census Bureau 
American Community 
Survey
2000 U.S. census (5%
PUMS)
2003 NSF/SRS 
SESTATEducation
All degree levels 22.4 22.5 25.0
Bachelor’s 16.5 16.3 18.8
Master’s 29.0 29.0 32.0
Doctorate 37.6 35.6 39.5
NSF/SRS = National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics; PUMS = 
Public Use Microdata Sample; SESTAT = Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System.
NOTE:  Includes all S&E occupations other than postsecondary teachers because field of 
instruction was not included in occupation coding for 2000 census or the American Community 
Survey.
SOURCES:  NSF/SRS, SESTAT (2003), http://sestat.nsf.gov/; U.S. Census Bureau, PUMS 
(2000), http://www.ipums.org/ and American Community Survey (2003).
Global Effects
In addition to any benefits or costs that might be viewed as accruing to particular 
countries that send or receive highly skilled migrants, there are global effects that 
cannot be assigned to individual countries.[25] These are essentially all the effects 
that could result in greater global efficiency in the production of knowledge and of 
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goods and services. Even if one rejects the idea that one country benefits from wealth
and knowledge creation in another, this greater efficiency would result in a larger 
global sum of gross domestic product, however distributed. A better international 
flow of knowledge may increase the efficiency of new knowledge production 
globally because it leads to better solutions to particular problems and reduces 
duplication in R&D.
An international job market has important implications for the quality of job matches 
for both workers and employers. In a world where increased specialization leads to 
increased employer dependence on scarce or unique skill sets, the reasons employers 
find it increasingly efficient to search across borders are clear. Not only might an 
individual with a particular combination of skill and experience be hard to find, but 
the difference between the best and the second best job match may be large. At the 
same time, greater employment options resulting from a global labor market may 
allow workers to find the work most interesting to them.
There may also be a global benefit from the formation of international research and 
technology centers. Researchers studying innovation have long noted the apparent 
benefits of geographic clustering of particular research activities. To a great extent, 
this clustering of specialized research required international migration of highly 
skilled workers for staffing.
For all of these reasons, international high-skill migration is likely to have a positive 
effect on global incentives for human capital investment. It increases the 
opportunities for highly skilled workers both by providing the option to search for a 
job across borders and by encouraging the growth of new knowledge.
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Conclusion
This paper has outlined major research and policy issues related to international
high-skill migration. Simple models of brain drain and brain gain do not fully capture
either the complex movement of people and knowledge across borders or the effects
of this movement on knowledge creation and investments in physical and human
capital. There are potential positive and negative effects of high-skill migration for
both sending and receiving countries, and much research needs to be done to better
understand these effects. However, clearly few of these effects are "zero sum
games"—one country's gains are not necessarily another country's losses.
Beyond the sum of effects on individual countries, the global net effect of high-skill 
migration seems likely to be positive for both knowledge creation and economic 
growth and should result in more efficient use of highly skilled labor and an 
increased flow of knowledge.
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[1] The total effect of migration on the local or national public rate of return on public 
investment in education would include all of the effects discussed in this paper and may not be 
negative.
[2] The data limitations in the United States are illustrated by the title of a National Academy of
Sciences study, Immigration Statistics: A Story of Neglect. Although many data systems have 
improved since this 1985 report, many data gaps remain.
[3] To show this in a simple algebraic form, the expected value of an individual's human capital 
can be expressed as: , where E(H) is the expected value of
human capital, Pm is the subjective individual probability of migration, Ef is the expected value
of human capital, H, in the best foreign labor market, and Ed is the expected value of the same
human capital in the domestic labor market.
[4] To the extent that highly skilled also means specialized skills, additional training may make
individuals more, rather than less, sensitive to economic fluctuations. An example from the 
United States may be aerospace engineers, who have faced greater employment volatility than 
those in other occupations. 
[5] A prominent example of labor market instability being caused by return migration involved 
not highly skilled but low-skilled labor—the return migration of workers from Southeast Asia 
from the Arabian Peninsula at the time of the first Gulf War.
[6] This is determined by the location of the institution with which each coauthor is affiliated.
Thus, it could be between natives of the same country, one of whom works in the United States, 
or any other combination of nativities. 
[7] See Ahmed and Robinson (1994) for a profile of general emigration rates from the United 
States.
[8] Estimates of H-1B visa holders remaining in the United States for longer periods vary, but it 
is becoming a common visa status for high skilled individuals converting to a permanent visa. 
[9] This is a higher 5-year stay rate than had been estimated for earlier Ph.D. graduation cohorts, 
about half of whom stayed in the United States. This recent increase in the stay rate is associated
with an increase in the proportion of foreign graduate students coming from countries, such as 
China, that have very high stay rates. 
[10] This does not necessarily mean a return to their country of origin. Around 7% of temporary
visa recipients of U.S. doctorates reported on the 2002 Survey of Earned Doctorates that they 
have initial plans for employment in some third country. This is likely to be an underestimate of 
movement to third countries, as many do not have immediate plans, and many with immediate 
U.S. plans have either postdoc appointments or other short-term work experiences.
[11] Finn (2005) matches Social Security numbers from the Survey of Earned Doctorates to 
individual earnings records. To protect confidentiality, the Social Security Administration reports
Notes
E (H ) = P m  E f (H ) + (1 – P m ) E d (H )
back to Finn the percentage of a doctorate cohort that was found in their records, but does not 
provide information on any individual. Thus, determining whether the same individuals are
present each year is impossible.
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[12] The 2003 SDR also included an experiment in which some sample members were located
and interviewed outside the United States.
[13] One study that focuses on the mostly high-skill Australian diaspora is Graeme (2003). 
[14] This is discussed in Arora et al. (2001).
[15] One of many discussions of the effect of remittance is contained in the United Nations'
World Economic and Social Survey 2004. Part 2, International Migration.
[16] For a summary of this literature, see Friedberg and Hunt (1999).
[17] As in many policy debates, the arguments presented often lack symmetry. For example, 
economic critics of lower skilled immigration often worry that lower skilled immigrants act as 
substitutes in the labor market for lower skilled natives while complementing the labor of higher 
skilled natives, thus making the rich richer and the poor poorer. At the same time, concern exists 
that if highly skilled immigrants are substitutes for highly skilled natives, the incentive for
natives to invest in human capital will be reduced. If each proposition is accepted, it would then
be possible to make the dual argument—that lower skilled migrants increase the incentive for
natives to invest in human capital and that highly skilled migrants reduce income inequality.
[18] Econometricians have conducted considerable work on methods to analyze pooled cross-
sectional data of this nature. This case used a "fixed effects" regression that held department-
specific effects constant over time, but similar results were found using random effects and 
simple ordinary least squares models.
[19] One possible reason for the small negative results for Asians may have been the Chinese 
Student Protection Act of 1992, which allowed many Chinese students to change status from
student to permanent resident while still in school.
[20] Borjas (2000) discusses these concerns in the context of foreign teaching assistants.
[21] See U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2000).
[22] Limiting the analysis to those in S&E occupations raises the proportion of foreign-born 
individuals in SESTAT by a small amount. 
[23] Individuals with U.S. degrees who reentered the country after years of absence are also 
likely to have been excluded from the SESTAT estimates, as are individuals who entered S&E 
occupations with degrees only in non-S&E fields. 
[24] Open Doors 2004: Report on International Educational Exchange, Institute for
International Education, 2004.
[25] Any actual attempts to assign values at the national level would also
very global nature of business and R&D. Which country benefits from the work of a Brazilian 
citizen engineer working at a U.S.-located facility of a Germany-based firm doing development
work for a Chinese manufacturer? This specific example is real.
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